‘Reserved Ratification’:An analysis of states’ entry of reservations upon ratification of human rights treaties by McKibben, Heather & Western, Shaina
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Reserved Ratification’
Citation for published version:
McKibben, H & Western, S 2018, '‘Reserved Ratification’: An analysis of states’ entry of reservations upon
ratification of human rights treaties', British journal of political science.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000631
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S0007123417000631
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
British journal of political science
Publisher Rights Statement:
Copyright © 2018 Cambridge University Press. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final
version is available online from Cambridge University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000631
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
RECTO: States’ Entry of Reservations Upon Ratification of Human Rights Treaties 
VERSO: McKIBBEN AND WESTERN 
‘Reserved Ratification’: An Analysis of States’ Entry of 
Reservations Upon Ratification of Human Rights Treaties 
 
HEATHER ELKO McKIBBEN AND SHAINA D. WESTERN* 
 
[FIRST FOOTNOTE] 
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis (email: 
hemckibben@ucdavis.edu); Department of Politics and International Relations, 
University of Oxford (email: shaina.western@politics.ox.ac.uk). We would like to 
thank Debra Leiter, Shareefa Al-Adwani, the editor, and three anonymous reviewers 
for their helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank the 
Department of Political Science at the University of California, Davis for their 
financial support in carrying out this project. Replication data are available in Harvard 
Dataverse at: https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.7910/DVN/7KPGDO and online appendices at 
https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123417000631. 
[END OF FIRST FOOTNOTE] 
 
[ABSTRACT] 
Governing elites often ratify human rights treaties, even when their policies do not 
align with those treaties’ obligations. This article argues that this can be explained by 
the fact that executives anticipate the potential challenges these treaties could raise 
vis-à-vis their domestic policies and enter different types of reservations when they 
ratify to head them off. The types of reservations they use depend on key 
characteristics of the executive’s policies and practices, as well as its relationship with 
the legislative and judicial branches. Other domestic actors can raise different types of 
challenges depending on variations in these key factors. The types of reservations 
executives use will therefore vary depending on the specific challenges ratification 
raises for them. Using an original dataset of the reservations states entered on human 
rights treaties registered with the United Nations, and employing an event history 
analysis, this study shows that the particular challenges treaties present for executives 
in different types of states help explain variation in how they use reservations when 
they ratify human rights treaties. 
[END ABSTRACT] 
 
[BEGIN TEXT] 
International law functions, in large part, because political activists can use domestic 
institutions to hold governing elites accountable to their international treaty 
obligations.1 These challenges can be raised against the regime itself, as well as 
against domestic policies. Because of the potential for such challenges, governing 
elites face countervailing incentives regarding whether or not to ratify international 
treaties.2 Ratifying comes with reputational benefits, as it allows governing elites to 
show that they are willing to co-operate with other states, which makes doing so 
                                                 
1 Hafner-Burton, Lavec, and Victor 2016; Neumayer 2005; Simmons 2009. 
2 Chapman and Chaudoin 2013; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; 
Hathaway 2002, Hathaway 2003, Hathaway 2005, Hathaway 2007; Powell and Staton 2009; Simmons 
and Danner 2010. 
widely appealing.3 At the same time, the challenges that ratification can raise 
vis-à-vis governing elites’ domestic policies and practices decreases their incentive to 
sign on to these agreements. A significant body of literature is therefore dedicated to 
the study of the conditions under which governments are likely to ratify international 
treaties. However, ratification is not a straight up or down decision: governments do 
not simply adopt or not adopt international agreements. When they ratify, governing 
elites can, and often do, enter different types of reservations to qualify various aspects 
of their treaty commitments. We argue that including reservations as part of an 
analysis of the decision to ratify can help us better understand states’ decisions to 
commit. 
Reservations, as widely discussed in the political science and international law 
literatures,4 exclude part or vary the effect of a treaty, thus allowing governing elites 
to modify their obligations at ratification. Entering reservations therefore allows 
political elites to signal a commitment to co-operate by ratifying a treaty, while also 
allowing them to insulate domestic policies and practices that conflict with certain 
aspects of the treaty from challenges that could be raised by other political actors.5 
Executive elites, play a particularly important role in this reservation process. They 
                                                 
3 These reputational benefits are particularly relevant for the ratification of human rights treaties (Lupu 
2016), which we focus on here. 
4 E.g., Helfer 2006; Hill 2016; Redgwell 1993; Schabas 1996; Simmons 2009; Swaine 2006. 
5 Goodman 2002; Koremenos 2016. Note that we are not arguing that reservations are necessarily 
anti-human rights. Instead, we recognize that human rights agreements are often vague – containing 
ambiguous language regarding how the treaties should be interpreted (Koremenos 2016). Reservations 
provide governing elites with leverage in determining how the treaty will be interpreted and enforced 
vis-à-vis their own domestic policies and practices. The result is variation in what cooperation ‘looks 
like’ for different states, depending on the specific types of reservations they enter. 
are the actors involved in the actual negotiation of international treaties and are 
officially charged with entering reservations to them.6 We therefore expect the 
potential for international treaties to be used to challenge the policies and practices of 
executive elites, in particular, to be an important factor driving reservation decisions. 
These ratification and reservation decisions can be modeled as the end stage of a 
negotiation wherein an executive can choose to push its actual treaty commitments 
closer to its own preferences than the agreement reached at the bargaining table. 
There are several ways executives can do so. They can ratify without substantive 
reservations, while entering reservations that influence the interpretation and 
enforcement of the treaty in their state (‘procedural’ reservations), while entering 
reservations that reduce or eliminate their legal obligations to certain parts of the 
treaty (‘article-qualifying’ reservations), or while entering reservations that subjugate 
the entire treaty to domestic law (‘treaty-qualifying’ reservations).7 Understanding 
                                                 
6 Note that this is true regardless of whether the legislature is involved in the treaty ratification 
process. For example, records show that even reservations expected by legislative elites in the US 
Senate (which officially ratify treaties) are often proposed by the administration. For evidence of this 
type of process, see Pell (1992). 
7 This categorization, based on Landman (2005), captures the degree and kind of treaty obligations 
governing elites can decide to accept. This measurement is not the only way to categorize reservations 
at the state level. Neumayer (2005) and Hill (2015) count the number of reservations, understandings 
and declarations states enter. Simply counting reservations also does not get at ‘degree’, as one 
treaty-qualifying reservation can potentially mitigate treaty obligations to a greater degree than two 
procedural reservations. Simmons (2009) classifies reservations into five categories: broad, specific, 
national code, capacity and enforcement reducing. Yet her measure does not vary based on the degree 
of treaty modifications, which makes it difficult to tell whether the reservations are major or minor. 
The categorization we use allows us to measure both differences in degree as well as differences in 
kind, and therefore is the most useful for our purposes. 
the variation in the types of reservations states enter is important, because reservations 
directly affect the obligations states take on when they ratify a treaty. In other words, 
reservations are not simply formal legal subtleties. They directly affect states’ 
compliance requirements. Depending on the specific reservations they enter, states 
could adopt different practices but still technically be in compliance with a treaty. To 
illustrate, consider the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
Malaysia entered a reservation to this convention stating that under certain 
circumstances, it was not obliged to follow the clause calling for states to protect 
persons from torture or medical experimentation without consent and equal rights. 
Thus while other states may have to follow these provisions, the Malaysian 
Government has a legal loophole through which it does not have to abide by this part 
of the treaty. It would still, however, technically be in compliance with its legal 
obligations. Variation in reservations can thus lead to significant variation in 
co-operation – that is, it has a direct impact on what international co-operation ‘looks 
like’.8 To understand international co-operation more generally, it is therefore also 
important not only to understand when executives are likely to ratify treaties, but also 
to account for how they are likely to ratify – that is, to understand the type of 
reservations they are likely to enter. 
                                                 
8 Indeed, with regard to human rights agreements, different treaty commitments are directly related to 
actual human rights practices. A lesser degree of commitment, characterized by more severe 
reservations, is negatively associated with actual human rights practices (Landman 2005). This is not to 
say that reservations necessarily make human rights worse, but it could be that states that include 
reservations tend to have worse human rights records, all else equal. 
Focusing on human rights treaties – which tend to have the greatest use of 
reservations9 – we argue that executive elites’ decision regarding what reservations to 
enter when a treaty is ratified is a strategic choice. They choose whether and how to 
ratify in order to mitigate challenges that ratification creates vis-à-vis their political 
power and domestic policies. In particular, we argue that executives in states 
transitioning away from a more repressive regime will more readily ratify without 
entering substantive reservations than other types of regimes. In contrast, compared to 
non-repressive executives, executives in repressive regimes will less readily ratify 
human rights treaties and more readily enter agreements using treaty-qualifying 
reservations. Finally, executives who are more constrained relative to the legislature 
and judiciary will more readily enter procedural and article-qualifying reservations 
than those who are less constrained. 
We test our argument using an original dataset that codes the ratification and 
reservation choices made by states across the human rights treaties registered with the 
United Nations.10 Using an event history analysis, which allows us to analyze 
ratification and reservation decisions jointly, we compare how variation in domestic 
institutions affects the risk that executives will ratify human rights treaties in different 
ways – not ratifying, ratifying with particular types of reservations or ratifying 
without reservations. We find that executives in different types of regimes differ in 
their risk of ratifying in ways that are consistent with our theoretical argument. 
Combining an analysis of ratification with the decision regarding how to use 
reservations, our theory and analysis contribute to our understanding of treaty 
                                                 
9 Koremenos 2016. 
10 See the Appendix for a full list of the treaties that are included in the analysis. 
commitments, and thus also contribute to our understanding of international 
co-operation more generally. 
 
[LEVEL A HEADING] MAKING RESERVATIONS WHEN RATIFYING 
Executives are largely responsible for negotiating international treaties on behalf of 
the state. Once these treaties are ratified and in force,11 however, other international 
and domestic actors can use them to challenge executive elites’ policies and practices. 
Reservations provide one way for executives to overcome such constraints, as they 
can use them as part of their legal defense when challenged.12 Due to their 
involvement in the negotiation process, they often recognize what reservations might 
                                                 
11 When we refer to ‘ratification’, we include in the analysis other acts such as ‘accession’, which is 
simply ratification of a treaty without being a signatory. Indeed, as the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (1966) states, ‘ ‘Ratification’, ‘Acceptance’, ‘Approval’ and ‘Accession’ mean in each case 
the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be 
bound by a treaty’ (Article 2 paragraph 1(b)). We include any act whereby a state establishes its 
consent to be bound by a treaty in our analysis of ‘ratification’, broadly defined. 
12 For example, the United Kingdom (UK) used such a legal defense in the Campbell and Cosans vs 
UK case, in which the government argued that it had not violated the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The UK Government argued that because it had taken steps 
to reduce corporal punishment in schools and because it had entered a reservation with regard to 
educational policy, it could not be held in violation. Although the European Court of Human Rights did 
not find this argument compelling, this case illustrates that reservations are used in specifying how the 
treaty should be interpreted. Similarly, the United States successfully used its reservation to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that required its consent for a 
case to be taken to the International Court of Justice when Yugoslavia threatened to do so citing 
violations of the convention. 
be necessary. Indeed, Bosniak’s discussion13 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Migrant Workers notes that the use of reservations was actively discussed during the 
negotiation of the treaty, and thus key executive officials would be aware of where 
reservations would be needed.14 In addition, it is often the executive involved in the 
negotiations who officially enters reservations to the treaty. Executive elites are 
therefore central actors when analyzing what states enter reservations, when and how 
they do so, and why. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Types of Reservations 
Reservations can be classified according to the ways they can be used to deal with 
challenges to the executive and/or its existing policies. As Landman shows,15 there 
are four main ways a treaty can be ratified, as defined by the types of reservations that 
can be entered.16 In many cases, a treaty does not directly threaten the executive and 
does not challenge existing policies. As such, reservations that modify the substantive 
elements of the treaty are unnecessary. Thus the first category captures the ratification 
of a treaty ‘without any substantive reservations’. This can be done by ratifying 
without reservations, or by ratifying with reservations that are not related to the 
                                                 
13 Bosniak 1991. 
14 Although administrations may change over the course of a treaty’s negotiation and ratification 
stages, the executive should still be aware of conflicts between existing policies and laws either based 
on the experience of civil service officials who remain consistent or through briefings of the previous 
regime. 
15 Landman 2005. 
16 As discussed above, while there are multiple ways to categorize reservations, we use Landman’s 
(2005) classification because it best captures the variation in reservations we seek to analyze – both the 
‘degree’ and ‘kind’ of modification different reservations make to treaty obligations. 
substance of the treaty (non-substantive reservations). For example, some elites use 
reservations to specify that their ratification of a treaty to which Israel is (or may 
become) a party does not constitute their recognition of Israel as a state. This type of 
reservation does not relate to the treaty’s substance, and is therefore not considered a 
substantive reservation. In both cases of ratification ‘without substantive reservations’ 
the actual application of the treaty is not affected. Ratification with any other type of 
reservation (substantive reservations) does affect the application of the treaty in some 
way. 
Some executives face challenges based on the technical requirements of a treaty. 
As a legal instrument, a treaty can be interpreted in ways that challenge existing 
domestic policies, even if those policies are in line with the spirit of the treaty. This is 
particularly the case when treaty language is vague – which many human rights 
treaties are.17 The second category of ratification therefore captures ratification with 
reservations that lay out procedures that will be used in the application and 
enforcement of the treaty. Executives can use such reservations, first, to specify how 
their state will interpret specific definitions and clauses laid out in the treaty. 
Secondly, they can use this type of reservation to control the interpretation of the 
treaty by highlighting a particular piece of domestic legislation that they argue is 
consistent with the principles of the treaty, stating that compliance with this 
legislation is sufficient for compliance with the treaty. Finally, when a treaty calls for 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule on disputes over the treaty, political 
elites can enter reservations stating that the ICJ cannot have jurisdiction to enforce the 
agreement against their state without explicit consent. Overall, these types of 
                                                 
17 Koremenos 2016. 
reservations give the executive some degree of control over the procedural application 
of the treaty by constraining how it can be interpreted and enforced. We refer to these 
types of reservations as ‘procedural reservations’. 
However, in many cases the treaty itself may challenge the foundations of an 
executive’s policies and practices. At the same time, because of domestic and 
international pressure to ratify,18 the executive may have an incentive to adopt the 
agreement for political expediency. In such cases, reservations could be used to reject 
or subject certain parts of the treaty to domestic law such that the treaty does not harm 
the executive, while at the same time allowing the executive to reap the benefits of 
ratification. Thus, the third and fourth categories capture the ratification of a treaty 
while at the same time rejecting certain parts in its application to their state. 
The first of these categories captures ratification with reservations that reject 
specific clauses and/or articles of the treaty. These types of reservations allow 
executives to remove the application of the legal obligations that certain parts of the 
treaty create, and thus to keep in place key domestic policies that might be 
inconsistent with those obligations. For example, when ratifying the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Israel entered a 
reservation to Article 7(b) stating that where religious laws prohibited women from 
serving as judges in religious courts, the treaty would not apply. We refer to these 
types of reservations, which qualify the legal obligations associated with a particular 
part of a treaty, as ‘article-qualifying reservations’. 
The last category captures ratification with reservations that apply to the treaty as 
a whole. The most common type of reservation that falls into this category is 
                                                 
18 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009; Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008. 
characterized by statements that the entire treaty will be subsumed under domestic or 
religious law, and that compliance must be interpreted using that law rather than 
explicit treaty language. These types of reservations allow political elites to qualify 
the application of the legal obligations created by a treaty as a whole, thus protecting 
key domestic policies that might be inconsistent with the general purpose of that 
treaty. For example, when the elites of El Salvador ratified the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, they entered a 
reservation stating that the treaty, as a whole, would only be enforced ‘to the extent 
that its provisions do not prejudice or violate the provisions of any of the precepts, 
principles and norms enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador’. 
We refer to these types of reservations, which apply to the enforcement of the treaty 
as a whole, as ‘treaty-qualifying reservations’. 
Focusing on the use of these different types of reservations, we seek to provide a 
more holistic explanation of when and how states choose to commit themselves to 
human rights treaties. In doing so, we integrate the decision to enter particular 
reservations into the decision to ratify. We argue that the risk that an executive will 
ratify a human rights treaty in a particular way (that is, using particular types of 
reservations) differs depending on the specific nature of the challenges that 
ratification can raise for that executive. 
 
[LEVEL A HEADING] EXECUTIVE POWER AND INTERESTS 
There are a number of mechanisms at both the international and domestic levels 
through which international treaties can be used to check executives’ power. When 
analyzing human rights treaties, the challenges that could potentially be raised by 
other domestic actors are particularly important to consider. First, most human rights 
treaties concern the relationship between a state and its citizens rather than between 
states. Secondly, and relatedly, human rights treaties rely on domestic enforcement, as 
international enforcement mechanisms between states (such as reciprocity) are not 
likely to be in effect. Finally, domestic institutions are also particularly important to 
consider because human rights treaties often use ambiguous language in order to 
secure wide participation,19 leaving them open to interpretation at both the legislative 
and judicial levels.20 Because the costs of including reservations to human rights 
treaties are fairly low for many governments relative to the benefits of ratification, 
using reservations can be an appealing solution,21 helping executives protect their 
policies and practices from challenges that can be raised by other domestic actors. 
The potential for such challenges depends on a state’s institutional characteristics. 
We argue that the challenges that human rights treaties pose to executives depend 
on several factors including their current policies and practices and the relative power 
of the executive compared to the legislative and judicial branches of government. We 
expect executives to use different types of reservations depending on the specific 
challenges they face. First, with regards to variation in policies and practices, we 
argue that human rights treaties do not challenge the executive in regimes that are 
transitioning away from more repressive regimes, and can even provide support for 
policies they want to keep in place. If anything, ratifying without reservations is likely 
to help these regimes more than most. They are therefore likely to ratify human rights 
treaties without entering reservations. On the other end of the spectrum, human rights 
treaties have the potential to be used to pose significant substantive challenges to 
                                                 
19 Goodman 2002. 
20 Goldsmith and Posner 2003. 
21 Parisi and Ševčenko 2003. 
executives in repressive regimes. Such regimes are therefore likely to be more 
reluctant to ratify human rights treaties, in general. When they do ratify (potentially 
because of international pressure to do so),22 they are likely to use treaty-qualifying 
reservations more readily than non-repressive executives in order to protect the 
policies and practices they use to remain in power. Part of the risk to the executive 
and its policies also depends on the degree to which they are constrained by the 
legislative and judicial branches of government. These risks depend on how the treaty 
is interpreted and implemented, rather than the substantive nature of the agreement. 
They therefore do not necessarily need to use treaty-qualifying reservations more than 
other regimes. Instead, we argue that more constrained executives are more likely to 
use mid-range reservations – procedural and article-qualifying reservations, in 
particular – in order to control how other domestic elites can exploit the treaty. 
Overall, the institutional characteristics of a state influence executives’ likelihood of 
using different types of reservations. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Executives Transitioning from Repressive Regimes 
The executives of states transitioning away from more repressive regimes – that is, 
states in which governing democratic elites have only recently come into power – face 
a different set of incentives than other regimes. Because the regime has not been 
solidified, the executives of transitioning states are likely to make strategic decisions 
based on a desire to protect the regime. We argue that ratifying human rights treaties, 
and doing so without entering reservations, is one strategic choice that can help them 
do so. 
                                                 
22 For evidence of such pressure, see Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999), Simmons (2009), Wotipka and 
Tsutsui (2008). 
Ratifying human rights treaties allows governing elites to signal their intent to 
institute democratic reforms to both domestic and international audiences.23 More 
importantly, we argue that ratifying helps the political elites of transitioning 
democracies ‘lock in’ domestic policies related to human rights in order to guard 
against non-liberal elements that might threaten their political power.24 As Goodman 
describes,25 ‘locking in’ human rights commitments can achieve this goal in three 
ways. It can: (1) guard against the policies of a future non-liberal government by 
protecting rights such as minority rights that they might try to violate, (2) ‘hedge 
against’ a non-liberal takeover and (3) help prevent the growth of non-liberal 
elements in the first place, by guaranteeing political rights such as the freedom of 
speech.26 
                                                 
23 Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015. 
24 Moravcsik 2000. 
25 Goodman 2002, 540. 
26 We recognize that transitioning executives face political instabilities that to address, could arguably 
require them to constrain individual freedoms. These executives might therefore need to use 
article-qualifying reservations to deal with the transitional challenges they face. We do not, however, 
expect this to hold for the specific types of transitioning executives we are theorizing about: executives 
transitioning away from more repressive regimes (not from more democratic ones). The leaders of 
these types of regimes are likely to have preferences that favor more democratic values than the 
regimes that preceded them, and rights violations would undermine their legitimacy in breaking from 
the old regime. We therefore expect that they would not be likely to institute policies that constrain 
individual freedoms, and thus not need to use article-qualifying reservations in order to do so. We find 
that this holds empirically. In Appendix Table 13 we report the results of a model that analyzes the risk 
that the elites of executives transitioning away from repressive regimes will ratify with 
article-qualifying reservations. These types of executives actually have a lower risk of ratifying than 
other types of executives, though this decreased risk is not statistically significant. These results are 
Similarly, there are significant economic benefits – in terms of increased trade, 
foreign direct investment and foreign aid – associated with establishing a commitment 
to the rule of law27 and protecting physical integrity rights.28 These economic 
benefits can further strengthen the regime. Both ‘locking in’ civil and political rights 
and helping to secure the economic benefits associated with adhering to human rights 
standards more generally can therefore help support the political power of the 
executives of a transitioning democracy. 
Reservations weaken these benefits. Most importantly, reservations provide 
loopholes for governing elites to avoid having to adopt new policies, which in some 
cases might be quite costly, in order to follow international standards. Using 
reservations therefore does not provide as strong a ‘lock-in’ commitment, and thus as 
strong a defense against non-liberal challengers that might threaten the regime. 
Non-liberal challengers could also exploit the loopholes created by reservations to slip 
back into repressive ways if they are able to gain political power. In addition, the 
material benefits (such as increased trade and aid) that stem from respecting human 
rights are largely based in actual human rights practices rather than in human rights 
commitments alone.29 If reservations prevent states from adopting the policies 
needed to protect human rights, the material benefits of having good human rights 
standards are unlikely to manifest. 
                                                                                                                                            
consistent with our argument that these executives are most likely to seek to ‘lock in’ policies that 
protect human rights. 
27 Haggard, MacIntyre, and Tiede 2008; Lebovic and Voeten 2009. 
28 Blanton and Blanton 2007; Lebovic and Voeten 2009. 
29 Nielsen and Simmons 2015. 
The benefits of ratifying human rights treaties are therefore strong for the 
executives of transitioning democracies. By ‘locking in’ human rights policies and 
providing economic benefits, they can help protect and solidify the position of the 
governing regime. Using reservations can diminish these effects. We therefore expect 
the executives of transitioning democracies to ratify more readily than other regimes 
and to do so without reservations.30 This argument leads to the following testable 
hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: All else constant, relative to other types of executives, executives in 
states transitioning away from more repressive regimes should have a 
greater risk of ratifying human rights treaties, and more specifically, a 
greater risk of doing so without entering substantive reservations. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Repressive Executives 
Some executive elites rely on domestic practices that violate human rights in order to 
remain in power.31 These are precisely the practices that international human rights 
treaties are designed to inhibit. They include physical integrity protections such as 
freedom from torture, but also more political freedoms such as freedom of movement, 
                                                 
30 Note that there could be alternative explanations for such a ratification strategy. For example, newly 
developing bureaucracies of the executive branch of transitioning regimes might simply not have the 
capacity to analyze the legal ramifications of international treaties and construct reservations to head 
them off. Similarly, the elites of transitioning democracies are argued to have a strong interest in 
conforming to international human rights norms (Moravcsik 2000), and might therefore ratify and do 
so without reservations in order to most strongly signal their commitment to those norms. We therefore 
run models that control for these potential alternative explanations and find that our argument holds 
even when we control for these possibilities. These models are reported in Appendix Table 13. 
31 Davenport 2007. 
freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and electoral self-determination.32 
Human rights treaties therefore conflict with the interests of repressive executives, 
increasing the potential for challenges to be raised against the domestic practices they 
use to retain political power.33 Relative to the executives of other types of regimes, 
we therefore expect the executives of repressive regimes to be more reluctant to ratify 
human rights treaties. 
However, they might still ratify these treaties even if somewhat reluctantly, as 
executives face international pressures to ratify human rights treaties.34 Repressive 
systems also tend to have weak domestic institutions, lessening legislative and 
judicial elites’ ability to hold executives accountable to their international 
commitments, and thus making ratification potentially less costly.35 Moreover, as 
                                                 
32 For example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment protects against the violation of physical integrity rights, and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights protects individuals’ political freedoms. Although such rights are most 
clearly stated in specific treaties such as these, protecting individuals’ rights is a common theme in all 
human rights agreements. For instance, the Convention on the Rights of the Child includes the right to 
the freedom of expression, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
includes provisions on representation, and the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their 
Families includes provisions on freedom of movement, freedom of expression and representation. We 
therefore expect reservations to be considered with regard to all types of human rights treaties. 
33 Indeed, Conrad and Ritter (2013) argue that human rights treaties can be used to support challengers 
to the regime. 
34 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009; Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008. 
35 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005); Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007). Indeed, Simmons (2009) 
argues that autocracies that ratify human rights treaties are ‘false positives’ – states that ratify the treaty 
but do not follow the principles espoused in it. 
Vreeland shows,36 repressive elites might even receive some domestic benefits from 
ratification, as ratifying a human rights treaty can potentially assuage domestic 
challengers who are criticizing the regime. At the same time, however, ratifying an 
international treaty is a long-term commitment, and repressive elites face uncertainty 
about the future. They do not know how domestic institutions might change, and 
when and how challengers might arise. The treaties they ratify could potentially be 
used in the future to raise challenges to the regime.37 
We argue that reservations – particularly treaty-qualifying reservations – allow 
governing elites in these regimes to hedge against this possibility. These reservations 
prioritize domestic law over the treaty as a whole. They can thus help repressive elites 
reduce the risk that political actors and institutions could draw on those treaties to 
challenge domestic laws that allow them to use rights-violating policies to remain in 
power. For example, when ratifying the Convention on Torture, elites of the United 
Arab Emirates added a reservation stating that ‘the lawful sanctions applicable under 
national law, or pain or suffering arising from or associated with or incidental to these 
lawful sanctions, do not fall under the concept of “torture” defined in article 1 of this 
Convention or under the concept of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment mentioned in this Convention’. This reservation allowed executive elites 
to protect domestic policies that might conflict with the overall objective of the 
convention, but that they need in place to safeguard their political power from 
‘unlawful’ challenges. Overall, we therefore expect that executive elites who use 
repressive tactics to remain in power will ratify with treaty-qualifying reservations 
                                                 
36 Vreeland 2008. 
37 Conrad and Ritter 2013. 
more readily than the elites of less repressive regimes.38 Together, these arguments 
lead to a second testable hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: All else constant, relative to other types of executives, those in 
repressive regimes should be more reluctant to ratify human rights 
treaties in general, and should have a greater risk of entering 
treaty-qualifying reservations when they do ratify. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Constrained Executives 
It is not only repressive executives or executives who face a strong potential to return 
to a repressive regime that can have their policies and practices challenged. All 
executives face potential challenges if they ratify human rights treaties, because the 
implementation and enforcement of international treaties is largely carried out by 
other domestic elites. Political elites in the legislature often enact domestic legislation 
implementing (or at least based on) these treaties, and political elites in the judiciary 
are largely charged with enforcing them. However, human rights treaties often include 
vague and imprecise language and clauses.39 In the implementation and enforcement 
process, legislative and judicial elites can potentially interpret such language in ways 
executives did not intend, and in a way that challenges particular policies. Yet this 
concern does not affect all regimes equally. Legislatures and judiciaries that have 
greater power relative to the executive have greater potential to raise such challenges 
effectively. Executives facing more powerful legislatures and judiciaries (that is, 
                                                 
38 Note that we are not arguing that we should see repressive executives using treaty-qualifying 
reservations often. We are simply arguing that they will use treaty-qualifying reservations more often 
than non-repressive executives. 
39 Koremenos 2016. 
executives who are more ‘constrained’ in their power) therefore have a greater 
incentive to try to pre-empt such challenges from being raised in the first place. We 
argue that procedural and article-qualifying reservations, in particular, can help 
executives avoid these types of challenges by specifying precisely how a particular 
clause will be interpreted when being enforced in their state (procedural reservations) 
or by eliminating that clause from application to their state altogether 
(article-qualifying reservations). We therefore expect more constrained executives to 
more readily use these types of reservations than those who are less constrained in 
their power.40 
Procedural reservations allow executive elites to specify how various aspects of 
the treaty must be interpreted in their state. They thus constrain legislative and 
judicial elites’ ability to raise challenges to executives’ domestic policies and 
practices by interpreting and using the treaty in ways the executive did not intend 
upon ratification. For example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that 
children have a right to life, but is agnostic on when childhood begins. When ratifying 
this treaty, governing elites in France therefore entered a reservation stating: ‘The 
                                                 
40 We do not, however, argue that more constrained executives will be more or less likely than 
unconstrained executives to use treaty-qualifying reservations. Unlike the case of repressive executives 
who are (by definition of a repressive regime) inherently more likely than non-repressive executives to 
have overarching policies and practices inconsistent with a human rights treaty, there is nothing 
inherent in executive constraint that makes constrained executives’ overarching policies and practices 
more inconsistent with a human rights treaty than those of less constrained executives. They thus do 
not have a greater need to use treaty-qualifying reservations. We therefore focus our argument on the 
use of procedural and article-qualifying reservations, which target the vagueness of treaty language, in 
particular, and its ability to be used against specific policies – the key characteristic of human rights 
treaties on which we expect constrained executives to focus. 
Government of the French Republic declares that this Convention, particularly article 
6, cannot be interpreted as constituting any obstacle to the implementation of the 
provisions of French legislation relating to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.’ 
This reservation clarifies the interpretation of when ‘childhood’ will be considered to 
begin in the treaty’s enforcement in France. By doing so, the governing elites of 
France protected policies regarding the termination of pregnancy that were currently 
in place from being challenged by legislative or judicial elites invoking a different 
interpretation of when childhood begins. 
Article-qualifying reservations allow executives to remove particular clauses with 
which specific domestic policies might not perfectly align. By doing so, they can 
protect those policies from challenges that could be raised by invoking the treaty. In 
particular, because treaty creation is a multilateral decision-making process involving 
elites from different states that have different interests regarding which human rights 
norms to protect and how to protect them, there might be some specific language in 
the resulting treaty that does not align with all of the executive elites’ own domestic 
policies – or at least that could potentially be interpreted in a way that does not align 
with those policies.41 For example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
stipulates that children should be able to acquire nationality, to the extent that it is 
possible. However, some states have domestic policies in place that restrict nationality 
based on descent. Executives in these states might want to avoid committing to treaty 
language that could obligate them to change their policies to allow the children of 
foreigners to become nationals of their own state. Article-qualifying reservations can 
help deal with this problem. For example, addressing this nationality issue when 
                                                 
41 Koremenos 2016. 
ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Switzerland entered a reservation 
stating that: ‘The Swiss legislation on nationality, which does not grant the right to 
acquire Swiss nationality, is unaffected.’42 
In both cases – that is, when governing elites use procedural and/or 
article-qualifying reservations – legislative elites are prevented from using a treaty as 
a basis for passing new laws that alter current domestic policies that executives want 
to protect, and judicial elites are prevented from using the treaty as a basis for a legal 
ruling that challenges those policies and corresponding practices. The more power 
that other political elites have relative to the executive (that is, the more constrained 
the executive’s power), the greater the incentive executive elites have to use 
procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations when they ratify a human rights 
treaty, and thus the greater the risk that they will do so. This argument leads to the 
following testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: All else constant, the greater the constraints on the executive’s 
political power, in general, the greater the risk that the executive will 
ratify a human rights treaty with procedural and/or article-qualifying 
reservations. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Legislative and Judicial Constraints 
Digging deeper into the logic of the argument about executive constraint, we expect 
to see executives entering procedural and article-qualifying reservations regardless of 
whether it is the legislature or the judiciary that has more power than the executive. 
                                                 
42 We note that this reservation was subsequently withdrawn in 2007. The key point for us, however, is 
that it was entered upon ratification (1997), and was in place from the time of ratification until it was 
withdrawn. 
However, the magnitude of these effects may vary when these factors are separated 
out. First, when the legislature has greater power than  the executive, we argue that 
procedural and article-qualifying reservations are likely to be used more readily. As 
discussed above, the executive might want to prevent a more powerful legislature 
from passing legislation that implements an international treaty using an interpretation 
of vague language that the executive did not intend upon ratification. 
It is also important to note, however, that in some states (for example, the United 
States), legislative elites have veto power over the ratification of human rights 
agreements. They can potentially use that veto power to compel the executive (who 
officially enters the reservations at the international level) to enter reservations that 
help ensure that their policies (and ability to set domestic policy) cannot be 
challenged by other elites invoking the language of the international treaties they 
ratify. For example, the head of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in 
his report regarding the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) that:  
[BEGIN DISPLAYED QUOTE] 
The Committee recognizes the importance of adhering to internationally recognized 
standards of human rights. Although the US record of adherence has been good, there 
are some areas in which US law differs from the international standard. For example, 
the Covenant prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
persons below the age of eighteen but US law allows it for juveniles between the ages 
of 16 and 18.43 In areas such as these, it may be appropriate and necessary to question 
                                                 
43 Note that this was only allowed until 2005. The key point, however, is that at the time of ratification, 
it was a key part of US domestic policy and practice that the US Senate wanted to protect the United 
States from the imposition of the ICCPR. 
whether changes in US law should be made to bring the United States into full 
compliance at the international level. However the Committee anticipates that 
changes in US law in these areas will occur through the normal legislative process.44  
[END DISPLAYED QUOTE] 
In other words, legislative elites in the US Senate wanted to prevent the 
ratification of the ICCPR from constraining their ability to control the creation of US 
law in this issue area. A reservation was therefore entered to deal with this issue, 
stating that ‘the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional 
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant 
woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of 
capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age’. 
Regardless of whether legislative or executive elites are the ones pushing to 
protect policies, the logic underlying when and where reservations should be used is 
the same. We expect to see procedural and article-qualifying reservations used more 
readily by executives who face greater legislative constraints. They might do so to 
protect their own policies and interests, and/or to protect the interests of a legislature 
that has formal or informal veto power over ratification. This argument leads to the 
following testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: All else constant, the greater the veto power of the legislature relative 
to the executive, the greater the risk that the executive will ratify a 
human rights treaty with procedural and/or article-qualifying 
reservations. 
                                                 
44 Pell 1992, 4. 
The power of the judiciary relative to the executive also likely influences 
executives’ reservation choices. In particular, the judiciaries of some states have 
broad interpretative powers that they hold independently of the executive. In these 
states, executive elites have little control over how the treaties they ratify will be 
enforced by domestic courts. When ratifying a human rights treaty, they therefore risk 
that it will be enforced in ways that do not correspond to how they intended the treaty 
to be interpreted and applied when they ratified it. The risk can be amplified by the 
fact that international courts can rule on many of these treaties, which can influence 
the domestic interpretation of treaties. Executive elites of states with an independent 
judiciary have no control over such judicial processes. When these executives ratify a 
human rights treaty, they therefore risk that future rulings made by their courts could 
go against their own intentions and interests. 
We argue that political elites can exert a degree of control over their judiciaries’ 
ability to interpret and apply human rights treaties by entering procedural and/or 
article-qualifying reservations. For example, governing elites in several states added 
reservations to allow flexibility in a clause of the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which stated that jailed juveniles and adults must be treated 
separately. As an illustration, the Government of Canada stated in a reservation that it 
‘accepts the general principles of article 37 (c) of the Convention, but reserves the 
right not to detain children separately from adults where this is not appropriate or 
feasible’.45 By entering reservations that guaranteed flexibility in this matter, 
governing elites protected themselves from being held in violation of the treaty by 
                                                 
45 In the year of ratification, Canada was coded with a judicial independence score of 0.98 out of a 
maximum possible score of 1 (on a scale from 0 to 1), indicating a significant degree of judicial 
independence. 
their courts, should circumstances (such as a shortage of cells or no nearby juvenile 
facilities) result in juveniles being housed with adults. 
The power of an independent judiciary can therefore influence executives’ 
decisions regarding whether to enter reservations and what types of reservations to 
enter. This leads to a final testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: All else constant, the greater the independence of the judiciary from 
executive control, the greater the risk that the executive will ratify a 
human rights treaty with procedural and/or article-qualifying 
reservations. 
 
[LEVEL A HEADING] EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We argue that executives with different policies and practices, and with different 
degrees of constraint relative to other domestic elites, vary in their risk of ratifying 
human rights treaties in different ways. Some are reluctant to ratify at all, some 
readily ratify while entering certain types of reservations, and others readily ratify 
without entering any reservations. The nature of the potential challenges that ratifying 
human rights treaties creates for different executives drives their ratification choices. 
To test this argument, we draw on an original dataset that codes the types of 
reservations entered by states to all human rights treaties registered with the United 
Nations. The sample includes twenty-three treaties, and all states in the international 
system.46 
The key independent variables are indicators of various regime characteristics. 
First, we code a variable indicating whether the executive is in a state transitioning 
                                                 
46 A full list of the treaties included in the analysis, along with detailed information regarding the 
nature of states’ use of the various types of reservations, are provided in the Appendix. 
away from a more repressive regime (transitioning executive). We code this variable 
using the Polity IV ‘competitiveness of participation’ indicator,47 coding an executive 
as ‘transitioning’ if it falls in the ‘transitioning’ category of this variable and was 
more repressive before this regime came to power.48 Secondly, we code a variable 
indicating whether the executive is in a repressive regime (repressive executive). We 
again use the Polity IV ‘competitiveness of participation’ indicator, coding an 
executive as repressive (in our more general sense) if it falls either in the ‘repressive’ 
or ‘suppressive’ categories of this measure. These are states that prohibit political 
opposition entirely, or where the government either limits the amount of political 
opposition or excludes a substantial proportion of the adult population from 
participation. We argue that because both of these types of executives limit 
opposition, they are the most likely to use repressive tactics to do so. They thus both 
fit our more general category of ‘repressive’ executives. Thirdly, we code a variable 
indicating the degree to which the executive is constrained in its power relative to 
other domestic elites. We code this variable using the Polity IV ‘executive 
constraints’ indicator.49 Greater values of this measure indicate a greater degree of 
constraint on the executive.50 
                                                 
47 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014. 
48 The transitioning regime category of the Polity IV ‘competitiveness of participation’ measure 
includes executives transitioning away from a repressive regime as well as those transitioning away 
from a more democratic regime. Because our argument focuses on executives transitioning away from 
repressive regimes (i.e., they are more democratic than their predecessors and fear a return to 
repression), we only code those executives who fall into the transitioning category and were also more 
repressive prior to the ‘transitioning’ coding. Only a handful of ‘transitioning’ cases in the Polity IV 
data do not fall into this category. 
49 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014. 
Digging deeper into the nature of the constraints on the executive, we code 
variables indicating greater legislative and judicial power. For the legislature, we use 
the PolConIII variable from the Political Constraint Dataset,51 which measures the 
strength of legislative veto players. It accounts for the number of effective veto 
players, the extent to which veto players come from different political parties, and the 
alignment of the legislative and executive branches. Higher numbers on this scale 
indicate more legislative veto players, and that these veto players have preferences 
that differ from those of the executive. For the judiciary, we use Linzer and Staton’s 
estimate of judicial independence.52 This measure is based on a range of indicators 
and accounts for measurement error and missingness. Greater values indicate greater 
judiciary independence. 
While we focus our analysis on the role of the executive in the 
ratification/reservation process, it is important to note that several other factors have 
been argued to play a key role in this process. First, several scholars have shown that 
                                                                                                                                            
50 We note that this variable codes constraints from numerous sources, and is thus not only related to 
legislative and judicial constraint, but also to constraints from pressure groups. However, this measure 
is still consistent with our theory. While we focus on legislative and judicial constraints when we dig 
deeper into the specific institutional constraints we think influence executives’ reservation decisions, 
our more general argument can include constraints coming from any actors that are in a position to 
potentially raise challenges to executives’ policies and practices. 
51 Henisz 2002. 
52 Linzer and Staton (2015). Note that this measure covers the years 1948 to 2012, which allows our 
analysis to cover almost all years of the dataset. Other judicial independence measures are significantly 
more limited in timespan, and using them would therefore would drop a significant number of 
observations from the analysis. 
a state’s legal system effects the likelihood that states will include reservations.53 
States with legal systems based in Islamic law are more likely to include reservations, 
as are states whose legal system is based on common law. Secondly, these factors 
have also been found to explain ratification, more generally,54 and thus need to be 
taken into account in our analysis. In addition, the literature shows that states are 
more likely to ratify a human rights treaty when more states have already ratified it.55 
We therefore include a variable capturing the (logged) number of states that have 
previously ratified a given treaty.5657 
 
                                                 
53 Hill 2016; Simmons 2009. 
54 Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Simmons 2009. 
55 E.g. Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Goodliffe et al. 2010; Neumayer 2007; Simmons 2009; Wotipka 
and Tsutsui 2008. 
56 Because this study covers so many years, we face a problem with including variables controlling for 
human rights protections in a state, as the data from early years in our analysis is not yet collected. 
Including such variables drops over thirty years from the analysis and risks losing data for many states 
– data that all falls in the earlier years of treaties’ ratification processes. When these variables are 
dropped, we therefore face a significant problem with left censoring. It is the early ratifiers of many of 
these agreements that are dropped, and thus their risk of ratifying in different ways (which is a 
substantial part of the data) is omitted from the analysis. In addition, we examine a broad range of 
human rights agreements that seek to protect many different kinds of rights. It is not clear what specific 
rights being protected in a state might help explain ratification across this wide array of different 
agreements. Given these two issues, we do not include a variable indicating a state’s level of human 
rights protections in the analysis – a choice that is consistent with other recent works in the 
ratification/reservations literature. 
57 We do, however, run models including human rights protections as robustness checks. The results of 
these models are reported in the Appendix and are consistent with the substantive results reported here. 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Description of the Models 
Ratifying with different types of reservations can be modeled as different ways of 
experiencing the ‘event’ of ratification. As such, event history models (duration 
models) are routinely used to model the general phenomenon of treaty ratification.58 
We therefore follow the literature in arguing that an event-history approach is most 
useful for testing our argument. However, our analysis is more complex than previous 
models of ratification. In particular, we take into account the fact that there are 
multiple ways that states can experience the ratification ‘event’ – that is, executives 
can ratify with different types of reservations. We are interested in how different 
factors influence the risk of ratification in these different ways. 
We therefore use multiple event-history models to account for each of these ways 
of ratifying; the unit of analysis is treaty-country-year. For each human rights treaty, 
we have observations for each country over time. The observations start in the year 
the treaty was first open for ratification, and end when that particular country ratified 
the treaty.59 This modeling approach has several benefits. First, it allows us to model 
and directly account for variation in the risk of a country’s ratification across different 
ratification events, as well as for each event over time.60 Secondly, using multiple 
models allows independent variables to exert varying effects across different ways of 
ratifying (that is, across different models). Indeed, executives’ risk of ratifying (that 
                                                 
58 E.g., Chapman and Chaudoin 2013; Simmons 2009; Von Stein 2008. 
59 If a country never ratifies, the last observation is 2011, when our data ends. 
60 See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004. Indeed, Simmons (2000) argues that the event-history 
approach best captures variation in underlying risk because this approach estimates the baseline hazard 
of ratification, as opposed to a linear model that would assume a constant risk of ratification (see 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). 
is, their ratification ‘hazard’) can vary depending on the specific type of ratification 
event being considered, providing support for our argument that breaking out the 
types of ratification is informative. For example, political elites’ risk of ratifying 
without any substantive reservations is likely different from their risk of ratifying with 
a treaty-qualifying reservation. 
Thirdly, the hazard rate of ratification with different types of reservations that 
underpin the analyses can vary over time. In other words, the chance a state will ratify 
two years after a treaty is open for ratification (given that it has not ratified it before) 
is likely different than the chance a state will ratify thirty years after a treaty is open 
for ratification (given that it has not ratified it before). Indeed, this is the case with our 
data, as illustrated by the baseline hazard estimates reported in the Appendix. We 
need a model that can capture the fact that these underlying hazard rates vary over 
time. The duration model does just this.61 
The event-history approach also allows us to address issues of right- and left-hand 
censoring.62 Moreover, as we explicitly argue, reservation decisions are intertwined 
with ratification decisions. While most empirical studies of states’ use of reservations 
look only at those states that have ratified,63 as we note above, discussions about 
reservations are evident during the treaty negotiations themselves. When deciding to 
                                                 
61 Note that even with the assumption of proportional hazards in the Cox models (i.e., that the ratio of 
probabilities that states with different types of executives will ratify in a particular way is constant over 
time) the model allows the underlying hazard rates on which those hazard ratios are based to vary over 
time. 
62 Right-hand censoring occurs when states exit the study without ratifying, and left-hand censoring 
occurs when states enter the system after the treaty was created; both of these are present in our data. 
Event-history analysis directly addresses both of these issues (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). 
63 See Hill 2016; Neumayer 2007; Simmons 2009. 
ratify, elites discuss the nature and type of reservations they would use if they were to 
ratify, and whether such reservations are permissible.64 The decision regarding 
whether or not to ratify is thus linked to the decision regarding how to ratify. By 
estimating multiple event-history models, we capture the link between the two by 
treating the use of different types of reservations as different types of ratification 
events to be studied. 
One alternative would be to use a selection model (for example, a Heckman 
model). Such an approach would account for the right-hand censoring by running two 
equations. The first equation would model the decision to ratify, and the second 
would model the use of reservations.65 However, such an approach treats ratification 
and reservations as separate processes that have interrelated errors, whereas our 
theory conceives of these processes as happening simultaneously. Moreover, because 
these models do not account for duration dependence, we argue that using 
event-history models best fits our theoretical argument. 
The results of our event-history analyses are reported in Tables 1 and 2.66 The 
tables report hazard ratios for each model, which indicate the chance that a state from 
                                                 
64 Lonnroth 1991; Swaine 2006. 
65 As a robustness check, we ran such models and the substantive results are largely the same as those 
presented here. Those results are reported in the Appendix. 
66 Note that we test each executive characteristic in separate models. This is because for each 
hypothesis, the comparison category is ‘all other types of executives’. Including other executive 
characteristics in a model would mean that this is no longer the comparison category. For example, 
including the variable for transitioning executives in the model analyzing the behavior of repressive 
executives, the comparison category for repressive executives would be ‘all executives who are neither 
repressive nor transitioning’ instead of being ‘all executives who are not repressive’ (thus including 
transitioning ones). 
the ‘treatment group’ (for example, a state with a repressive executive) that has not 
experienced some event (ratification in a particular way) by time t will experience the 
event at that moment in time relative to the chance that a state from the ‘control 
group’ (for example, a state with a non-repressive executive) that also had not 
experienced the event by time t will experience it at that moment in time. Values 
greater than 1 indicate that a particular type of executive has an increased risk of 
ratifying in a particular way relative to other types of executives, and values less than 
1 indicate a decreased risk. Standard errors for all models are clustered by 
country-treaty in order to account for potential unobserved heterogeneity across these 
different dyads.67 
Overall, the results of these models are consistent with the predictions of our 
argument about how different types of executives choose to ratify human rights 
treaties. Based on these models, smoothed hazard function estimates are also derived, 
and illustrate three important things about the results. First, the hazard rate (which 
shows the chance that a state will ratify in a particular way at any given point in time 
conditioned on the fact that it has not yet done so) varies over time in all of the 
models. The event-history approach is therefore appropriate, as it allows these varying 
hazard rates to be taken into account without having to specify the functional form of 
the underlying risk. Secondly, while there are some exceptions, the models show a 
general trend that the hazard rate associated with ratification in a particular way 
decreases over time. In other words, the longer a state holds out to ratify a human 
rights treaty in a particular way, the lower the chance that it will now do so. Thirdly, 
                                                 
67 To further test that unobserved heterogeneity across these very different types of treaties is not 
driving our results, we also run frailty models clustering on treaties. The results of those models are 
consistent with those discussed here, and are reported in the Appendix. 
the values of the hazard rates showing the chance that a state will ratify in a particular 
way at any given point in time (conditioned on not having ratified by that point) are 
small. This is not surprising, as there are few treaty-country-years in which 
ratification takes place when compared to the full set of treaty-country-years in which 
ratification was possible.68 This set of cases is even smaller when considering 
ratification with particular types of reservations – leading to lower hazard rates for 
ratification in those ways. It is therefore important to note that while the hazard rates 
may seem small, the chance of ratifying at any given moment in time is fairly small. 
Seen in perspective, the results are therefore substantively meaningful. More 
importantly, the difference between the hazard rates of ratification in various ways for 
different types of executives is significant. Our theory is designed to predict these 
differences. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Transitioning Executives 
Models 1A and 1B test Hypothesis 1, and the results are consistent with its 
predictions. They show that the executives of states transitioning away from a more 
repressive regime have a significantly greater risk of ratifying a human rights treaty, 
in general, than those in other types of regimes (Model 1A). They also have a 
significantly greater risk of ratifying without entering any substantive reservations 
compared to all other types of executives (Model 1B). These results are demonstrated 
by the fact that the hazard ratio associated with the Transitioning Executive variable 
in Models 1A and 1B is greater than 1 and statistically significant at the 95 per cent 
confidence level. 
                                                 
68 Ratification in any way occurred in 2,207 of the 1,10,564 treaty-country-years in which ratification 
was possible. 
The actual value of the hazard ratios also provides important substantive 
information about their differences in ratification choices. The hazard ratio of 1.34 
associated with the Transitioning Executive variable in Model 1A indicates that if 
both a transitioning and non-transitioning executive have not ratified a human rights 
treaty by time t, the executive in the state transitioning away from a more repressive 
regime has a chance of ratifying it at that point in time that is about 34 per cent 
greater than the chance that the executive not in a transitioning regime will do so. 
An analysis of smoothed hazard function estimates can help illustrate this 
increased risk. About ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, conditional on the 
fact that they have not yet done so, a transitioning executive has about a 3.9 per cent 
chance of ratifying it at that point in time, while a non-transitioning executive only 
has a 2.9 per cent chance. Consistent with the general trend in all models, those 
hazard rates decrease over time. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, 
given that they have not yet ratified, a transitioning executive has a 1.8 per cent 
chance of doing so at that point in time, while a non-transitioning executive has only a 
1.35 per cent chance.69 Overall, throughout the time a treaty is open for ratification, 
the chance that an executive who has not yet ratified a treaty will do so at any given 
point in time is greater for transitioning executives than it is for non-transitioning 
executives. As illustrated by the results of Model 1A, that chance is approximately 34 
per cent greater. 
                                                 
69 For all models, the hazard rate estimates reported are derived from an analysis of plots of the 
smoothed hazard functions estimated based on each Cox model. These plots are reported in the 
Appendix. Note that because the values reported here are derived from graphs, they are not exact. They 
are, however, very close approximations. To further illustrate the results, survival estimates derived 
from each of the Cox models are also reported in the Appendix. 
Transitioning executives also have a greater chance of ratifying human rights 
treaties without entering substantive reservations than non-transitioning executives. 
The hazard ratio of 1.41 associated with the Transitioning Executive variable means 
that at any given point in time, if both a transitioning executive and a 
non-transitioning executive have not yet ratified a human rights treaty without 
substantive reservations, the transitioning executive has 1.41 times the chance of 
doing so compared to the non-transitioning executive. Smoothed hazard function 
estimates help illustrate this. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, 
conditional on not yet having done so, a transitioning executive has a 2.75 per cent 
chance of ratifying without a substantive reservation at that point in time, while a 
non-transitioning executive only has a 1.95 per cent chance. A transitioning executive 
who has held out for thirty years without ratifying without substantive reservations 
has a 1.13 per cent chance of doing so at that point in time while a non-transitioning 
executive who has held out for thirty years only has a 0.8 per cent chance. Overall, 
conditional on not yet having done so by any given point in time, transitioning 
executives have a 41 per cent greater chance of ratifying without substantive 
reservations than non-transitioning executives. 
In general, the difference between the ratification strategies of transitioning and 
non-transitioning executives is significant. Executives of states transitioning away 
from more repressive regimes have a greater risk of ratifying human rights treaties, 
and of ratifying those treaties without entering substantive reservations, compared to 
other types of executives. While the actual hazard rates are relatively low, the 
difference in ratification strategies is substantively meaningful. Given that there are a 
small number of cases of ratification compared to the full set of treaty-country-years 
in which ratification was possible, the chance of ratification at any given point in time 
is small. The substantive difference in the risk that transitioning and non-transitioning 
executives will ratify, and ratify without substantive reservations, is thus significant. 
These results are in line with our theory about the incentives of executives in a state 
moving away from a more repressive regime to ratify human rights treaties. They 
have incentives to lock in the benefits of democratic reform – both political and 
economic – by ratifying human rights treaties that obligate themselves and subsequent 
regimes to uphold certain human rights standards, and to make those obligations as 
strong as possible. The increased risk associated with ratification and ratification 
without substantive reservations for executives in transitioning regimes is consistent 
with this argument. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Repressive Executives 
Models 2A and 2B test Hypothesis 2, and yield results consistent with our argument. 
Compared to non-repressive executives, repressive executives have a significantly 
lower risk of ratifying human rights treaties, all else constant, but have a greater risk 
of ratifying with treaty-qualifying reservations. These results are demonstrated by the 
fact that the hazard ratio associated with the Repressive Executive variable is less than 
one in Model 2A and is greater than one in Model 2B. In both models, these 
differences in risk are statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. 
The results are also substantively significant. The hazard ratio of 0.8 associated 
with the Repressive Executive variable in Model 2A shows that repressive executives 
who have not yet ratified a human rights treaty by any given point in time have a 
chance of ratifying that is only 80 per cent as high as the chance that a non-repressive 
executive will ratify. For example, the smoothed hazard function estimates show that, 
conditional on not yet having ratified, ten years after a treaty is opened for ratification 
a non-repressive executive has a 3.3 per cent chance of doing so at that point in time 
while a repressive executive has only a 2.65 per cent chance. Thirty years after a 
treaty opened for ratification, given that it has not yet ratified, a non-repressive 
executive has a 1.5 per cent chance of ratifying at that point in time while a repressive 
executive only has a 1.2 per cent chance.70 Overall, repressive executives have a 
lower chance of ratifying, which is about 80 per cent the size of the chance a 
non-repressive executive will do so. 
In contrast, repressive executives have a greater risk than non-repressive 
executives of ratifying with treaty-qualifying reservations. The hazard ratio of 1.77 
reported in Model 2B shows that a repressive executive has 1.77 times the chance of 
ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation compared to a non-repressive executive. 
Substantively, the smoothed hazard function estimates show that, conditional on not 
yet having done so, a repressive executive has a 0.08 per cent chance of ratifying with 
a treaty-qualifying reservation ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, while a 
non-repressive executive has only a 0.045 per cent chance. That hazard rate largely 
decreases over time, and thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, given that 
he or she has not yet ratified with a treaty-qualifying reservation, a repressive 
executive has a 0.0575 per cent chance of doing so at that point in time while a 
non-repressive executive has only a 0.0325 per cent chance. Overall, the difference 
between repressive and non-repressive executives’ choices about the use of 
treaty-qualifying reservations is significant. At any given point in time, the chance of 
doing so is almost twice as great for repressive executives as it is for non-repressive 
ones. 
                                                 
70 Estimated smoothed hazard function plots are presented in the Appendix. To further illustrate the 
results, survival estimate plots are also reported. 
In general, while the hazard rates are small, there are a small number of 
observations of ratification (and even fewer observations of ratification with 
treaty-qualifying reservations) compared to the full set of treaty-country-years in 
which ratification was possible. The overall chance of ratifying (and ratifying with 
treaty-qualifying reservations) at any given point in time is therefore low. Thus even 
if the differences between repressive and non-repressive executives’ ratification 
strategies are small in absolute terms, the results showing that these differences are 
significant are substantively meaningful when taken in perspective. These results are 
consistent with our argument about repressive executives’ incentives to ratify human 
rights treaties, which often conflict with their political policies and practices. It 
therefore makes sense that repressive executives are at a decreased risk of ratifying 
human rights agreements relative to other types of executives, and an increased risk of 
using reservations that protect their domestic policies and practices from a wide array 
of potential challenges (that is, using treaty-qualifying reservations) if they do ratify. 
These findings provide more nuanced information about when and why repressive 
executives ratify human rights agreements. While their choice to ratify may seem 
perplexing given the challenges it raises for their domestic policies, once the types of 
reservations that can be added at ratification are accounted for, it is considerably less 
so. 
 
[LEVEL B HEADING] Executive Constraints 
Models 3A and 3B test Hypothesis 3. Consistent with our argument, the results show 
that executives facing greater constraints on their power have a greater risk of 
ratifying human rights treaties while using procedural and/or article-qualifying 
reservations. In both models, the Executive Constraint variable has a hazard ratio 
larger than one, and the increased risk is statistically significant at the 95 per cent 
confidence level for the use of procedural reservations (Model 3A) and at the 90 per 
cent confidence level for the use of article-qualifying reservations (Model 3B). 
Substantively, the results in Model 3A show that at any given point in time, given that 
they have not yet done so, the most constrained type of executive has a chance of 
ratifying with a procedural reservation that is 2.43 times the chance that the least 
constrained type of executive will do so. Similarly, the results in Model 3B show that 
given that they have not yet done so, the chance that the most constrained type of 
executive will ratify with an article-qualifying reservation at any given point in time is 
1.7 times the chance that the least constrained type of executive will do so.71 
Analyzing the smoothed hazard function estimates, conditional on not having 
already done so, an executive facing significant constraints has a 0.9 per cent chance 
of ratifying with a procedural reservation ten years after a treaty opened for 
ratification and a 0.125 per cent chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying 
reservation. Executives facing few constraints have only a 0.37 and 0.073 chance, 
respectively.72 Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, given that they have 
not yet done so, a constrained executive has a 0.22 per cent chance of ratifying with a 
procedural reservation at that point in time, and a 0.08 chance of ratifying with an 
                                                 
71 These values are calculated based on the hazard ratio, which reports the variation in risk for a 
one-unit increase in executive constraint. To calculate the move from the least constrained type of 
executive (coded 0) to the most constrained type of executive (coded 6), we take the hazard ratio and 
raise it to the power of the difference between these values (in this case, six). 
72 For constrained executives versus unconstrained executives, taking into account both legislative 
constraints and judicial independence, the Appendix reports the variation in survival and hazard 
function estimates for these different types of executives. 
article-qualifying reservation. A largely unconstrained executive has only a 0.09 and 
0.047 per cent chance, respectively. Overall, constrained executives have a 
significantly greater chance of ratifying with a procedural or article-qualifying 
reservation than unconstrained executives. That chance is almost 2.5 times as great 
for procedural reservations and almost twice as great for article-qualifying 
reservations. 
Digging deeper into the sources of these executive constraints, Models 4A and 4B 
test Hypothesis 4 (which focuses on the role of legislative constraints) and Models 5A 
and 5B test Hypothesis 5 (which focuses on the role of judicial constraints). First, the 
results show that executives facing a more powerful legislature have an increased risk 
of ratifying with procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations. This is 
demonstrated by the hazard ratios greater than one that are associated with the 
Legislative Power variable in Models 4A and 4B. This increased risk is statistically 
significant – holding at the 95 per cent confidence level in both models. 
Substantively, the results of Model 4A show that for two executives who have made it 
to any given point in time without ratifying with a procedural reservation, an 
executive facing the most legislative constraints has 2.25 times the chance of doing so 
compared to an executive facing the fewest legislative constraints. In addition, the 
results of Model 4B show that for two executives who have not ratified with an 
article-qualifying reservation by any given point in time, an executive facing the most 
legislative constraints has 2.82 times the chance of doing so compared to an executive 
facing the fewest legislative constraints.73 Executives facing strong legislative 
                                                 
73 These values are calculated as the hazard ratios reported in Table 2 raised to the power of 0.72 (the 
distance between the code for executives facing the least versus the most legislative constraints). 
constraints have a significantly greater risk of ratifying with procedural and/or 
article-qualifying reservations than those facing fewer legislative constraints. 
Smoothed hazard function estimates further illustrate these results. Conditional on 
not yet having done so, an executive facing a powerful legislature has a 0.97 per cent 
chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation ten years after a treaty opened for 
ratification, and a 0.1755 per cent chance of doing so with an article-qualifying 
reservation. Executives facing weak legislatures have only a 0.43 and 0.0625 per cent 
chance, respectively. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, given that he 
or she has not yet done so, an executive facing a powerful legislature has a 0.27 per 
cent chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time and a 0.14 
per cent chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation. These are 
significantly greater than the chance executives facing a weak legislature will do so. If 
they have not yet ratified with these reservations thirty years after a treaty opened for 
ratification, executives facing a weak legislature have only a 0.12 per cent chance of 
ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time and a 0.05 per cent chance 
of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation. Overall, the difference in 
ratification strategies for states facing legislatures of varying strengths is significant. 
An executive facing a powerful legislature has over two times the chance of ratifying 
with a procedural reservation compared to an executive facing a weak legislature, and 
almost three times the chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation. This 
difference in ratification strategies is consistent with our argument. 
Judicial constraints also influence executives’ reservation decisions in important 
ways. The results of Models 5A and 5B report hazard ratios associated with the 
Judicial Independence variable that are greater than one. In states where the judiciary 
is more independent from executive control, executives have an increased risk of 
ratifying with procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations that is statistically 
significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. Substantively, the results from Model 
5A show that for two executives who have not yet ratified a human rights treaty with 
a procedural reservation by any given point in time, the one facing the greatest level 
of judicial independence has a chance of doing so that is 2.81 times the chance that 
the one facing the least independent type of judiciary will do so. Similarly, as 
illustrated by the results of Model 5B, for two executives who have not yet ratified 
with an article-qualifying reservation, an executive facing the most independent type 
of judiciary has 2.57 times the chance of doing so compared to an executive facing 
the least independent type of judiciary.74 Executives facing a more independent 
judiciary have a significantly greater chance of ratifying with procedural and/or 
article-qualifying reservations than those facing a less independent judiciary. 
Smoothed hazard function estimates help illustrate these results. Conditional on 
not yet having done so, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive 
facing a highly independent judiciary has a 1.05 per cent chance of ratifying with a 
procedural reservation at that point in time, while an executive facing a judiciary that 
is significantly less independent only has a 0.375 per cent chance of doing so. 
Similarly, an executive facing an independent judiciary has a 0.15 per cent chance of 
ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation at that point in time, while an 
executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary has only a 0.058 per cent 
chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, given that it has not yet 
done so, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary has a 0.24 per cent chance 
of ratifying with a procedural reservation and a 0.095 per cent chance of ratifying 
                                                 
74 These values are calculated as the hazard ratios reported in Table 2 raised to the power of 0.985 (the 
distance between the code for an executive facing the least versus the most independent judiciary). 
with an article-qualifying reservation at that point in time. An executive facing a 
significantly less independent judiciary has only a 0.085 and 0.037 per cent chance, 
respectively. Overall, the difference in ratification strategies predicted by our theory is 
significant. An executive facing a highly independent judiciary has almost three times 
the chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation and over 2.5 times the chance of 
ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation compared to an executive facing a 
significantly less independent judiciary. 
Overall, these results are consistent with our theory about how executives’ 
reservation decisions are influenced by the constraints they face. The difference in 
ratification strategies of executives facing varying levels of constraint is significant. 
While the hazard rates themselves are small, there are very few cases of ratification 
with procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations compared to the full set of 
treaty-country-years in which ratification was possible. The chance of ratifying with 
these reservations at any given point in time, in and of itself, is thus small. The 
differences in the hazard rates for constrained and unconstrained executives that we 
find are therefore substantively significant. These findings are consistent with the 
larger literature on reservations, as they align with Hill’s argument that the regimes 
most likely to use reservations are those that face the most constraints to comply with 
a treaty’s provisions.75 Going one step further, we find that executives who are more 
constrained in their power have an increased risk of ratifying with specific types of 
reservations – procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations. Characteristics of 
states’ domestic institutions, in particular, play a key role. The constraints that stem 
from the existence of a legislature with greater veto power or the existence of a more 
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independent judiciary exert especially significant effects on executives’ reservation 
decisions. 
 
[LEVEL A HEADING] CONCLUSION 
Human rights treaties are only effective if governing elites can be held accountable to 
their treaty commitments. In this article, we have taken a broad look at human rights 
agreements to determine which factors best explain the ways in which executives may 
ratify these treaties. Across different states, the domestic actors who can challenge 
executives’ policies and practices vary widely depending on the particular institutions 
in place. Executives in different states therefore face different incentives when 
deciding whether or not to ratify a human rights treaty and what reservations, if any, 
to enter when doing so. We have shown that key characteristics of executive elites’ 
position within the state influence how they are likely to use reservations upon 
ratification. In particular, executives from states transitioning away from a more 
repressive regime more readily ratify without entering substantive reservations. 
Repressive executives, in contrast, are generally more reluctant to ratify and are most 
at risk of ratifying with treaty-qualifying reservations. Finally, executives that are 
more constrained in their power relative to the legislature and judiciary more readily 
use procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations than less constrained executives. 
Interestingly, the results also seem to indicate that legislative constraints 
substantively impact executives’ use of article-qualifying reservations to the greatest 
extent, while the greatest substantive impact of judicial independence is on the use of 
procedural reservations. The findings produce a number of questions. Is there 
something more going on here regarding the particular type of constraints executives 
face? What drives their choice to use procedural reservations to a greater degree when 
faced with judicial constraints, but article-qualifying reservations to a greater degree 
when faced with legislative constraints? Addressing this issue is clearly worthy of 
future investigation. 
While we focused on political institutions, understanding the role of a state’s legal 
system also has important implications for executives’ ratification decisions, opening 
up another path for future work. Indeed, previous research shows that having a legal 
system based on Islamic law or common law influences whether or not a state is 
likely to ratify human rights treaties. While they are not the focus of our analysis, the 
results demonstrating how legal system type and reservation choice are related 
provides interesting insights into the role legal issues might play – not only in 
political elites’ decisions regarding whether or not to ratify a treaty, but also in 
deciding what reservations, if any, to enter. For example, the results from Models 1A 
and 2A show that Islamic law and common law states are more reluctant than states 
with other types of legal systems to ratify human rights treaties, in general, and the 
results from Model 1B show that they are especially more reluctant to ratify without 
any substantive reservations. Model 2B further shows that when these states do ratify, 
they more readily do so with treaty-qualifying reservations than states with other 
types of legal systems. Furthermore, as the results in Table 2 show, states with legal 
systems based on Islamic law also more readily ratify with article-qualifying 
reservations, while common law states have neither a greater nor a lesser risk of 
ratifying with either procedural or article-qualifying reservations than states with 
other types of legal systems. These findings are interesting, and suggest that 
ratification is not as simple as an up or down decision. Once we take into account the 
different ways that states can ratify, the relationships between legal system and 
ratification are more nuanced than they might appear. While these relationships were 
not the main focus of this study, this finding suggests that the legal system influences 
how states are likely to ratify, and that this issue is worthy of further investigation. 
Overall, our analysis of the types of reservations likely to be used in different 
political settings has important implications, as two dual processes are at work when 
states ratify human rights treaties with reservations. As several scholars have argued, 
the use of reservations can increase co-operation both by fostering state commitment76 
and by allowing ‘stronger’ treaties characterized by deeper co-operation.77 At the 
same time, however, reservations are unilateral actions taken by states and may hinder 
co-operation by minimizing the obligations states take on, or by subjecting 
international commitments to domestic law. This flexibility can be exploited, and 
states that include more severe reservations tend to have worse human rights 
practices.78 Is the benefit they extract in terms of commitment worth it in terms of 
outcomes, or do reservations provide too much flexibility, such that they end up 
inhibiting the goal of the treaty? Our findings imply that these dual processes likely 
vary depending on the reasons why reservations are included in the first place. It is 
therefore important to explore the ratification and reservation processes in greater 
detail. Helping us understand when and, more importantly, how states ratify 
international human rights treaties, we took a first step towards understanding a much 
larger puzzle about treaty commitment and international co-operation in human rights, 
more generally. 
However, several interesting questions remain. In particular, the focus in this 
article was on human rights treaties, which often use vague language, and thus states 
                                                 
76 Goodman 2002; Harrison 2005; Helfer 2006; Miles and Posner 2008; Swaine 2006. 
77 Helfer 2006; Swaine 2006. 
78 Landman 2005. 
often use reservations to define and qualify regarding their application to their state. 
Yet states use reservations in many different types of treaties, some of which are 
much more specific in their obligations, including environmental treaties, treaties 
dealing with disarmament, and those dealing with matters regarding co-operation in 
criminal law. Do the same processes that characterize states’ use of reservations when 
ratifying human rights treaties characterize their reservation choices when ratifying 
these other types of treaties? Given that reservations qualify treaty commitments, this 
is an important question that future research should answer in order to better 
understand co-operation in these other issue areas as well. 
[END TEXT] 
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Table 1 Analyzing Transitioning and Repressive Executives’ Ratification Choices 
 Model 1A: 
Ratification, 
in general 
Model 1B: 
No 
substantive 
reservations 
Model 2A: 
Ratification, 
in general 
Model 2B: 
Treaty-qualifying 
reservations 
Transitioning 
executive 
1.335** 1.406**   
 (0.077) (0.091)   
Repressive 
executive 
  0.806** 1.772** 
   (0.041) (0.460) 
Islamic law 0.444** 0.843** 0.466** 2.842** 
 (0.080) (0.057) (0.084) (0.756) 
Islamic law  
ln(time) 
1.396**  1.396**  
 (0.109)  (0.109)  
Common law 0.483** 0.644** 0.456** 1.634** 
 (0.074) (0.037) (0.070) (0.408) 
Common law  
ln(time) 
1.193**  1.197**  
 (0.081)  (0.082)  
Prior ratifiers 
(ln) 
0.965 0.846** 0.974 2.154 
 (0.062) (0.051) (0.062) (1.103) 
Observations 65,877 74,948 65,877 103,533 
log 
pseudolikelihood 
16502.907 12684.392 16505.831 495.305 
Wald 2 108.33 107.81 98.32 46.11 
prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors are clustered by country-treaty and reported in 
parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05 
  
Table 2 Analyzing Executive Constraints and the use of Reservations 
 Model 
3A: 
Proced
ural 
Model 3B: 
Article-qual
ifying 
Model 
4A: 
Proced
ural 
Model 4B: 
Article-qual
ifying 
Model 
5A: 
Proced
ural 
Model 5B: 
Article-qual
ifying 
Executive 
constraints 
1.160** 1.092*     
 (0.028) (0.052)     
Legislative 
power 
  3.092** 4.215**   
   (0.725) (2.428)   
Judicial 
independen
ce 
    2.855** 2.604** 
     (0.464) (0.938) 
Islamic law 0.450* 3.826** 0.448* 4.374** 0.537 4.554** 
 (0.203) (0.917) (0.186) (1.046) (0.222) (1.122) 
Islamic law 
 ln(time) 
1.751**  1.622**  1.623**  
 (0.332)  (0.280)  (0.282)  
Common 
law 
0.988 1.123 0.953 0.985 0.303** 0.902 
 (0.109) (0.258) (0.098) (0.219) (0.102) (0.197) 
Common 
law  
    1.540**  
ln(time) 
     (0.224)  
Prior 
ratifiers (ln) 
1.220 0.878 1.409 1.101 1.239 0.894 
 (0.226) (0.342) (0.294) (0.460) (0.232) (0.341) 
Observatio
ns 
78,900 84,081 91,289 96,999 92,215 97,933 
log 
pseudolikel
ihood 
3077.
640 
650.795 3467.
308 
696.571 3492.
715 
739.439 
Wald 2 48.74 35.00 34.38 38.68 55.63 38.86 
prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors are clustered by country-treaty and reported in 
parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05 
 
